State of Utah v. David Castle : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
State of Utah v. David Castle : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bradley P. Rich; Hakeem Ishola; Yengich, Rich & Xaiz; Attorneys for Appellant.
Thomas B. Brunker; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Craig C.
Halls; San Juan County Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. David Castle, No. 960755 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/540
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APP-; 
~
zw:r-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Case No. 960755-CA 
v. 
DAVID CASTLE, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR FAILURE TO STOP AT THE COMMAND 
OF A POLICE OFFICER, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-13.5 (1993); AND VARIOUS MISDEMEANORS, 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAN JUAN 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE SCOTT N. JOHANSEN, 
PRESIDING. 
BRADLEY P. RICH 
HAKEEM ISHOLA 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
175 East 400 South, Ste 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
THOMAS B. BRUNKER (4804) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
CRAIG C. HALLS 
San Juan County Attorney 
297 South Main 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Case No. 960755-CA 
v. 
DAVID CASTLE, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR FAILURE TO STOP AT THE COMMAND 
OF A POLICE OFFICER, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-13.5 (1993); AND VARIOUS MISDEMEANORS, 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAN JUAN 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE SCOTT N. JOHANSEN, 
PRESIDING. 
BRADLEY P. RICH 
HAKEEM ISHOLA 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
175 East 400 South, Ste 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
THOMAS B. BRUNKER (4804) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
CRAIG C. HALLS 
San Juan County Attorney 
297 South Main 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 14 
ARGUMENT 16 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
DECLARING A MISTRIAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S OBSTINATE 
REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS 
AND OTHER MISCONDUCT MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE 
TRIAL TO PROCEED IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE LAW OR 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO EITHER PARTY 16 
A. The trial court complied with the statutory 
requirement to state for the record the 
necessity of terminating the prosecution 17 
B. The trial court properly exercised its 
discretion to declare a mistrial because 
defendant's obstinate refusal to comply 
with the court's instructions made it 
impossible for the trial to proceed or 
for either party to obtain a fair trial 19 
CONCLUSION 26 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A - Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (1995) 
X 
Addendum B - Record page 463 
Addendum C - Record pages 480-86 
Addendum D - Record pages 510-22 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Arizona v, Washington, 434 u.s. 497 (1978) n, 22 
McKissick v. United States. 398 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968) . . 22 
United States v. Mastranaelo. 662 F.2d 946 (2nd Cir. 1981), 
cert, denied, 465 u.s. 973 (1982) 21 
STATE CASES 
State v. Nilson. 854 P.2d 1029 (Utah App. 1993) . . . . 20, 21 
State v. Pearson. 818 P.2d 581 
(Utah App. 1991) 2, 17, 19, 20, 21, 24 
State v. Whitman. 74 P.2d 696 (Utah 1937) 24 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (1997) 2, 18, 21, 23 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1995) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (1993) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (e) (Supp. 1996) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (1993) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (1993) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (Supp. 1997) 1 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 960755-CA 
v. : 
DAVID CASTLE, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his convictions for failure to stop at the 
command of a police officer, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (1993); speeding, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (1993); 
interference with a police officer making a valid arrest, a class 
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995); 
escape, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-8-309 (1995); driving while on suspension or revocation in 
another state, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. 53-3-227 (Supp. 1997); and carrying a concealed weapon, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 
(1993). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
1 
78-2a-3(e) (Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Where the pro se defendant's persistent refusal to comply 
with the trial court's instructions made it impossible for the 
trial to proceed in conformance with the law or without prejudice 
to either party, did his conduct justify declaring a mistrial? 
The appellate court reviews a trial court's grant or denial 
of a mistrial for a clear abuse of discretion, presuming that the 
trial court properly exercised its discretion. State v. Pearson. 
818 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1991)-1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of Utah Code Ann, § 76-1-403 
(1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with failure to stop at the 
command of a police officer, speeding, interference with a police 
officer making a valid arrest, escape, driving while on 
defendant contends that the Court should review the trial 
court's ruling for correctness because it involved a 
constitutional issue. Appellant's Brief at 2. However, the 
trial court's determination of defendant's motion to* dismiss in 
the second trial turned on whether it had correctly declared a 
mistrial in the first. Therefore, the *abuse of discretion" 
standard applied to mistrial determinations controls the appeal 
in this case. 
2 
suspension or revocation in another state, and carrying a 
concealed weapon. Defendant's first trial ended when the trial 
court declared a mistrial (R. 522). 
Prior to retrial, defendant moved to dismiss the 
information, claiming that double jeopardy precluded retrying him 
(R. 172). The trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 181-83). 
At the conclusion of the retrial, the jury convicted defendant of 
all six charged counts (R. 334). 
Defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment, again alleging 
that double jeopardy precluded retrying him (R. 351-56) . 
Although the trial court never expressly ruled on the motion, it 
effectively denied the motion when it entered its judgment (R. 
369). The trial court sentenced defendant to the statutory zero-
to-five-year prison term on the failure to stop at an officer's 
command and stayed the sentence pending defendant's completion of 
certain conditions (R. 369-70).2 Defendant timely filed his 
notice of appeal (R. 374). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After police pulled him over for speeding, defendant, who 
was armed and had an outstanding warrant, refused to comply with 
2The trial court subsequently amended the terms of 
defendant's sentence three times (R, 420, 427, 430). 
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any of the officer's commands and fled the scene after the 
officer arrested him. At the subsequent trial, where defendant 
represented himself, defendant obstinately refused to comply with 
the trial court's instructions about how to proceed, provoking a 
contempt conviction and a mistrial. 
Sergeant Douglas Hall clocked defendant exceeding the posted 
speed limit (R. 487-88, 563). After pulling defendant over, 
Officer Hall asked to examine defendant's license, registration 
and proof of insurance (R. 491). Defendant told Sergeant Hall, 
w%
 I don't need a driver's license. I'm a free citizen of the 
Republic'" (491, 568). Defendant added that there already 
existed an arrest warrant for him (id.). When Sergeant Hall 
asked defendant to accompany him to the patrol car to discuss the 
situation, defendant told Sergeant Hall that he did not want to 
get out of his car, told Sergeant Hall that he had a gun in his 
pocket and put his hand on his right front pants pocket (id.). 
Sergeant Hall told defendant to keep his hands away from the 
pocket, and, for the Sergeant's safety, to get out of the car (R. 
491-92, 568). Defendant refused to exit the car (R. 492, 568). 
Defendant asked if he could take the gun out (id.). Sergeant 
Hall told him that he could not (id.). Defendant asked Sergeant 
Hall what he would do if defendant allowed the Sergeant to 
4 
retrieve the gun; Sergeant Hall replied that he would probably 
confiscate it until the court proceedings concluded (id.). 
Defendant again told Sergeant Hall that he would not comply, but 
would drive to Monticello to see the judge (492, 569) . However, 
Sergeant Hall told defendant that he would not allow defendant to 
go see the judge because defendant had a concealed weapon, would 
not relinquish the weapon, and would not comply with the 
Sergeant's orders (R. 492-93). 
Sergeant Hall then placed defendant under arrest, told 
defendant that defendant had to exit the car immediately, and 
told defendant that he needed to retrieve the gun for his own 
security (R. 493, 569). Defendant again refused, but offered to 
have his wife retrieve the gun (id.). Sergeant Hall told 
defendant, "'No, I don't know you people. I need for you to get 
out of the car, immediately, and allow me to retrieve the gun"' 
(id.). Sergeant Hall then reached into the car to open the door; 
however, defendant grabbed Sergeant Hall's hand (id.). Sergeant 
Hall pulled his hand back out of the window, and defendant rolled 
up the window (id.). 
Sergeant Hall returned to his patrol car to call for backup 
(id.). As Sergeant Hall returned to the patrol car, defendant 
drove off (id.). Sergeant Hall informed his dispatcher that he 
5 
was following an armed suspect and requested assistance (R. 4 94, 
569-70). Approximately eight miles later, another officer 
stopped defendant (R. 495, 570). When defendant came to a halt 
he was promptly taken into custody and the handgun recovered (R. 
495-96, 570-71) . 
Defendant represented himself at trial (R. 480).3 Prior to 
trial, the trial court gave defendant detailed instructions about 
how to conduct the trial (R. 182). However, defendant repeatedly 
ignored those instructions (id.). 
At the conclusion of voir dire, the trial court asked 
defendant if he had any challenges for cause to any of the 
prospective jurors. In front of the prospective jurors, 
defendant responded: 
Mr. Castle: Well, as you know, this is a "witch trial" --
The Court: Mr. Castle, just say yes or no, please. 
Mr. Castle: And, it would be an insult --
The Court: Mr. Castle, please say yes or no. 
Mr. Castle: It would be an insult to any of these people --
The Court: Mr. Castle, say yes or no. Do you have any 
challenges to the panel? 
defendant raises no issue related to his self-
representation. 
6 
Mr. Castle: Absolutely not. 
(R. 463) (page 463 is attached as addendum B). 
Defendant began his opening statement by commenting, "If any 
of you were farmers, you'd appreciate the fertilizer that [the 
prosecutor] provided here a little while ago," and began telling 
the jury about his love for this country, his love for the 
constitution, and his service in Vietnam (R. 480-81). 
(Defendant's entire opening statement (R. 480-86) is attached as 
addendum C.) The trial court stopped defendant and explained to 
him that the opening statement only allowed him to outline what 
he believed the evidence would show (R. 481). 
Immediately after the trial court concluded its admonition, 
defendant resumed: 
Ya [sic] see, you will be prevented from hearing 
my side. That's what the attempt from the bench will 
be. There's the law and the facts. There's no great 
issue with the facts of this case. There's a few 
exceptions that he miss spoke, but nothing very 
material. However, there are grave and vast 
differences on the law. In China, the law is you will 
only have one child. Sadly, they are killing the 
children in excess of one. Now, if they made a law, 
here, to that effect, and you disregarded that, and you 
went to a jury and they said, disregard the law --
(id.). The trial court again stopped defendant and warned him 
that if he did not restrict himself to explaining the facts, the 
court would end defendant's opening statement and proceed with 
7 
the trial (R. 482) . 
Defendant again addressed the jury stating that he would try 
to comply with the judge's admonition "under that threat" (id.). 
He told the jury that, if allowed to speak, he would show the 
jury that he had the right to do everything that he did (id.). 
Defendant again emphasized, "I'll show that to you, if I'm 
allowed to speak. Think he'll let me?" (id.). The trial court 
responded, "It's time for your opening statement, Mr. Castle" 
UJLJ • 
Defendant then began discussing the charges, pointing out to 
the jury that the first charge carried a five-year prison term 
(id.). The following exchange then occurred: 
The Court: Mr. Castle, I'm telling you know [sic], 
you are not to make appeals to sympathy --
Mr. Castle: Oh, let's not be sympathetic to me, folks. 
The Court: (continuing) -- or to discuss what 
possible sentence may be imposed if you're convicted. 
That's not something that the jury should consider at 
all. 
Mr. Castle: Well, thank you. Thank you so much, 
Lyle. 
The Court: Mr. Castle, now, in this courtroom you 
will refer to Mr. Halls as, "Mr. Halls." You will 
refer to me as *judge," or "Your Honor, and you may 
refer to members of the jury as "Ladies and Gentlemen," 
or "Members of the Jury." You will show respect of 
everyone in the courtroom during the entire course of 
8 
the trial 
Mr. Castle: You can call me, "David." 
(R. 482-83). 
After this last comment, defendant did begin discussing the 
facts, but quickly digressed again into a discussion about the 
rights that he believed he had (R. 483-86) . Defendant told the 
jury that, while he respected the jury, he had "nothing but 
contempt for this court, and maybe I'll be found in contempt of 
court and go to jail" (R. 484). When defendant began to explain 
that he had every right to carry a concealed weapon because an 
assailant had one time put a gun to his head, and that he had a 
friend who was shot and killed, the trial court again stopped 
defendant's discussion (R. 486). The trial court gave defendant 
another opportunity to recount his version of the facts; however, 
defendant began arguing with the trial court about whether he 
would get a jury of his peers (id.) .4 At this point, the trial 
court ended defendant's opening statement, and the State began 
defendant had already told the jury that a jury of his 
peers means *[n]eighbors, people that knew you, people that knew 
of your character, your beliefs, people who knew what you've done 
in life" (R. 485). 
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its case-in-chief (R. 486).5 
While cross-examining Sergeant Hall, the State's first 
witness, defendant again brought up the penalties imposed against 
him, asking the Sergeant the amount of defendant's fines (R. 512-
13). (Defendant's entire cross-examination of Officer Hall, 
including the declaration of a mistrial (R. 510-22), is attached 
as addendum D.) The trial court sustained the State's objection 
(R. 513). Nevertheless, defendant continued, asking if the fines 
were "a lot" (ifU . 
Defendant then asked Sergeant Halls questions about 
constitutional philosophy. First, defendant quoted what he 
believed the constitution guaranteed to him (R. 515). The trial 
court sustained an objection, telling defendant that the line of 
inquiry had no relevance to the charges (id.). Rather than 
proceed with his questions, however, defendant argued that it had 
wa lot" of relevance to the case (id.). The trial court told 
defendant to move on, but defendant continued to argue, stating 
that the case was about "beliefs" (id.). Again, the trial court 
told defendant that whether Sergeant Hall personally agreed with 
defendant's beliefs had no relevance to the case (R. 516). 
5At first, defendant refused to sit down, but ultimately 
complied, stating that he did not want to go to jail (R. 486). 
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Defendant then asked Sergeant Hall if he had ever caught any 
bank robbers, murderers, or rapists (R. 516). The trial court 
again sustained an objection, informing defendant that only the 
events surrounding the charges had relevance to the case (isLJ . 
Defendant then asked Sergeant Hall to define "liberty" and 
asked him if liberty was a right (R. 517). The trial court again 
sustained the State's objection, finding the question irrelevant 
and argumentative (id.). The court also instructed the jury to 
disregard questions about Sergeant Hall's philosophy, reminding 
them that the only thing for them to determine was whether 
defendant committed the charged offenses (R. 517-18) . 
Nevertheless, defendant persisted, asking Sergeant Hall 
whether the case was about the liberty to travel in an 
automobile, and arguing to the trial court that the liberty 
argument was "very relevant as to whether I needed a driver's 
license, or not" (R. 518). The trial court told defendant that 
it had sustained the objection and instructed him to move to 
another line of questioning (id.). Defendant responded, "I 
object to jury tampering. I consider it jury tampering, to fail 
to allow all the argument to come before the jury" (id.). The 
trial court overruled defendant's objection and told him to get 
to questions about what happened on the night of the charged 
11 
crimes (id.). 
Defendant briefly complied and asked questions about whether 
he showed Sergeant Hall some identification and whether he told 
Sergeant Hall that he believed he had a right to carry a gun in 
his pocket (R. 518-19). However, defendant then asked for 
Sergeant Hall's opinion about whether defendant had a right to 
carry a concealed weapon (R. 519). Again, the trial court 
sustained the State's objection, noting that neither defendant's 
nor Sergeant Hall's opinion about the right to carry a concealed 
weapon had any relevance (R. 520). The trial court stated, WI 
[sic] doesn't matter what Mr. Castle thinks, or what Trooper Hall 
thinks" and warned defendant against making further side comments 
to the jury (id.). 
Defendant then gave Sergeant Hall a copy of a statute and 
asked if Sergeant Hall believed that defendant did not have the 
right to have a gun (R. 520). When Sergeant Hall stated that he 
did not think that defendant had the right to carry a concealed 
gun, defendant asked Sergeant Hall to read the statute (id.). 
The trial court told defendant that the court would instruct the 
jury on the law (idL) . Defendant objected, stating that the law 
said that he could have a gun (id.). The trial court admonished 
defendant that it had ruled that defendant could not ask the 
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question because it was a matter for jury instructions (R. 520-
21). Defendant persisted, commenting that the instructions did 
not include the specific statute, and that the statute was 
pertinent to the difference of opinion (R. 521). Again, the 
trial court admonished defendant not to argue because it had 
sustained the objection (R. 521). 
The trial court allowed defendant to show the court what he 
wanted Sergeant Hall to read, but then warned defendant that he 
had made his record (isL.)• Defendant began to argue the contents 
of the statute, but the trial court cut him off, telling 
defendant that he could not argue with the witnesses about the 
contents of the statutes (id.). 
Still, defendant persisted: 
Mr. Castle: Is a law relevant that says I can have 
a gun, in my car, concealed? 
The Court: Mr. Castle --
Mr. Castle: Am I being charged with that --
The Court: [Continuing] --no further discussion 
of these statutes. 
Mr. Castle: I'm being charged with the very thing, 
and it says right here, I --
(R. 522)• 
At this point, the trial court finally held defendant in 
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contempt and sentenced him to thirty days in jail (id.). After 
sentencing defendant, the trial court addressed the jury, 
"Members of the Jury, because this has happened, I'm forced to 
declare a Mistrial in this case. I'm reluctant to do that, 
because it means your effort here is wasted, but Mr. Castle is 
not following instructions -- * (id.). At this point, defendant 
interrupted and stated, "You Honor, you're the one who is in 
contempt" (id.). 
During the subsequent reprosecution, defendant filed a 
motion to dismiss, claiming that double jeopardy barred 
reprosecution (R. 122). The trial court denied the motion, 
holding that defendant's misconduct at the first trial: 
was sufficient to create a substantial likelihood that 
jurors would be diverted from their fact finding role, 
become confused about the law, and inclined to decide 
the case based upon an emotional reaction to the 
courtroom spectacle created by defendant. Under those 
circumstances, neither the defendant nor the state 
could receive a fair trial. The mistrial was therefore 
necessitated by intentional and contemptuous conduct of 
defendant that deprived that state of its right to a 
fair trial. Under those circumstances, the 
constitutional double jeopardy bar is not invoked 
(R. 182) . 
The argument sections contain additional relevant facts. 
SUMMARY QF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant contends that double jeopardy barred the second 
14 
prosecution. The parties do not dispute that, at the time the 
trial court declared a mistrial in the first trial, jeopardy had 
attached. Therefore, this case turns on whether the trial court 
properly declared a mistrial. 
Defendant contends that the trial court improperly declared 
a mistrial because: 1) the trial court purportedly failed to 
satisfy its statutory obligation to state for the record that a 
mistrial was necessary; and 2) the circumstances of this case did 
not make a mistrial legally necessary. 
The trial court satisfied its obligation to state for the 
record that a mistrial was necessary. At the time it declared a 
mistrial, the court told the jury that it was forced to declare a 
mistrial because defendant was not following instructions. 
Furthermore, the trial court elaborated on its reasons for 
declaring a mistrial during the second prosecution. The trial 
court stated that it granted to the mistrial because defendant's 
conduct made it impossible for either party to obtain a fair 
trial. 
The trial court also properly declared a mistrial. 
Defendant persistently ignored the trial court's legitimate 
instructions about the proper scope of an opening statement and 
cross-examination. Defendant made it clear that he would not 
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proceed in conformance with the law. Similarly, defendant forced 
the State to object constantly. Under these circumstances, 
defendant made it impossible for either party to obtain a fair 
trial. Therefore, the trial court properly declared a mistrial, 
and the State could reprosecute him without violating his double 
jeopardy rights. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
DECLARING A MISTRIAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S OBSTINATE 
REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS 
AND OTHER MISCONDUCT MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE 
TRIAL TO PROCEED IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE LAW OR 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO EITHER PARTY 
Defendant contends that the second prosecution violated his 
right not to be placed in jeopardy more than once for the same 
offenses. The parties do not dispute that jeopardy attached at 
defendant's first trial or that the State reprosecuted defendant 
for the same conduct. Therefore, this case turns on a single 
issue: whether the trial court properly declared a mistrial in 
defendant's first trial. If it did# double jeopardy did not 
prelude reprosecuting defendant; if it did not, the double 
jeopardy bar applied. 
Defendant contends that the trial court improperly declared 
a mistrial in his first trial; therefore, double jeopardy 
16 
precluded reprosecuting him. Defendant makes two claims. First, 
defendant claims that the trial court failed to make the 
statutorily required findings. Appellant's Brief at 17. Second, 
defendant contends that the circumstances of this case did not 
make a mistrial legally necessary. Appellant's Brief at 15-16. 
Because this case turns on whether the trial court properly 
declared a mistrial in the first trial, this Court may reverse 
the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the second 
prosecution only if the trial court clearly abused its discretion 
when it declared the mistrial. State v. Pearson. 818 P.2d at 
582. In addition, this Court must presume that the trial court 
properly exercised its discretion unless the record clearly 
establishes the contrary. IsL. See also Arizona V, Washington/ 
434 U.S. 512, 510 (1978) (trial court's mistrial determination 
arising out of defendant's lawyer's misconduct entitled to 
"special respect"). 
A. The trial court complied with the statutory requirement 
to state for the record the necessity of terminating 
the prosecution. 
Defendant argues the trial court Mid not make the requisite 
statutory findings." Appellant's Brief at 17. This statement 
comprises the sum of defendant's analysis on this point. 
Section 76-1-403 requires the trial court to find and state 
17 
for the record that terminating the prosecution is necessary. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(4)(c) (1995)- At the time that the 
trial court declared the mistrial, the jury had witnessed 
defendant's persistent refusal to comply the trial court's 
instructions and had witnessed the contempt conviction that 
defendant's conduct provoked. When it declared a mistrial, the 
trial court stated, "Members of the Jury, because this has 
happened, I'm forced to declare a Mistrial in this case. I'm 
reluctant to do that, because it means your effort here is 
wasted, but Mr. Castle is not following instruction -- n 
(R.522)(emphasis added). The trial court found and stated for 
the record that terminating the prosecution was necessary; 
therefore, it fulfilled its statutory obligation to make 
findings. 
Moreover, the trial court did not take this action hastily. 
The trial court tried to assist defendant throughout his opening 
argument and his cross-examination of the first witness and even 
instructed him before trial (R. 182, 481-83, 486, 513, 515-18, 
520-22). Nevertheless, defendant obstinately refused to comply 
with the trial court's instructions. The court did not declare a 
mistrial until defendant's conduct resulted in a contempt 
conviction and his removal from the courtroom (R. 522). See 
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State v. Pearson. 818 P.2d at 585 n.9 (findings sufficient where 
reasons for mistrial were obvious on the record and trial court 
did not hastily reach decision to declare a mistrial). 
In addition, the trial court stated its reasons for 
declaring the mistrial in greater detail when it denied 
defendant's motion to dismiss the second prosecution. At that 
time, the trial court noted that defendant's conduct made it 
impossible for either party to have a fair trial because 
defendant's conduct created a substantial likelihood that the 
jurors "would be diverted from their fact finding role, become 
confused about the law, and incline [sic] to decide the case 
based upon an emotional reaction to the courtroom spectacle 
created by defendant" (R. 182). Contrary to defendant's 
contention, the trial court more than adequately stated the bases 
for declaring a mistrial. Id. 
B. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to 
declare a mistrial because defendant's obstinate 
refusal to comply with the court's instructions made it 
impossible for the trial to proceed or for either party 
to obtain a fair trial. 
Discharging the jury before a verdict operates as an 
acquittal barring reprosecution unless the discharge results from 
*legal necessity." $££., e.g., State v. Pearson. 818 P.2d at 584. 
"Legal necessity" means that "the court must refrain from 
19 
prematurely discharging the jury unless it determines, after 
careful inquiry, that discharging the jury is the only reasonable 
alternative to ensure justice under the circumstances.'' Id. 
Section 76-1-403 (4) (c) identifies circumstances that would 
satisfy the legal necessity standard. State v. Nilson. 854 P.2d 
1029, 1031 n.3 (Utah App. 1993). That statute provides, in part, 
that : 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution 
[precluding reprosecution] if the termination takes 
place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting 
to an acquittal, and takes place after a jury has been 
impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the 
jury trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. 
However, termination of prosecution is not improper if: 
• * • * 
(c) The court finds and states for the record 
that the termination is necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed 
with the trial in conformity with the law; or 
* * * * 
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(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the 
courtroom not attributable to the state makes 
it impossible to proceed with the trial 
without injustice to the defendant or the 
state 
• * * * 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (c) (4) (1995) .6 
When defense counsel or defendant makes it impossible to 
proceed without prejudice to one of the parties, "legal 
necessity" exists justifying a mistrial and allowing 
reprosecution without violating double jeopardy. For example, in 
State v. Pearson, defense counsel asked Pearson whether the State 
had offered him a plea bargain. State v. Pearson. 818 P.2d at 
582. The trial court found the question prejudicial to the State 
because it placed doubt in the jurors' minds about the State's 
case's strength. Id. at 584. This Court affirmed the trial 
court's declaration of a mistrial. Id. at 584-85. 
in United States v. Mastrangelp, 662 F.2d 946 (2nd cir. 
1981), cert, denied. 465 U.S. 973 (1982), the trial court granted 
defendant does not contend, and no Utah case has held, that 
the statutory and constitutional %%legal necessity" standards 
vary. Therefore, the State will limit its discussion to 
establish that defendant's conduct made the mistrial ^legally 
necessary." fififi State v. Nilson. 854 P,2d at 1031 n.2 (noting 
that neither party delineated any difference between 
constitutional double jeopardy and section 76-1-403). 
21 
a mistrial when the government's key witness was murdered, most 
likely at defendant's behest, on his way to the courthouse to 
testify. Id. at 949-50. The Second Circuit considered it an 
obvious conclusion that if the defendant caused the witness's 
murder, manifest necessity existed for declaring a mistrial. Id. 
at 951.7 See alSP Arizona v. Washington. 434 U.S. 497, 834 
(1978) (mistrial proper where defense counsel made prejudicial 
statements in opening argument); McKissick v. United States. 398 
F.2d 342, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1968) (manifest necessity existed for 
a mistrial where the defendant informed his counsel that he had 
committed perjury and asked for counsel's assistance in 
committing additional perjury). 
Similarly, defendant made it impossible to proceed with the 
trial in this case. Defendant persistently ignored and argued 
about the trial court's legitimate instructions about how to 
proceed in conformance with the law. See Statement of Facts at 
6-14. Although he would sporadically comply, he consistently 
7The Second Circuit stated, "Appellant agree, as he must, 
that if he had in fact killed or arranged the killing of the 
witness . . ., the [trial] court could make a finding of manifest 
necessity for the declaration of a mistrial." Id. at 951. In 
that case, the defendant challenged the trial court's finding to 
hold an investigation and evidentiary hearing on whether 
defendant actually arranged the murder. Id. 
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slipped back into questions and comments that the trial court had 
told him were irrelevant and improper (id.). Throughout his 
opening statement and cross-examination, and especially at the 
time the trial court held him in contempt, defendant made it 
perfectly clear that he would not proceed in compliance with the 
trial court's instructions. To the contrary, he insisted that he 
could ask questions that the trial court correctly told him he 
could not and refused to ask questions that the law permitted. 
Because he would not limit his examination to what the law 
allowed, defendant made it impossible for the trial to proceed in 
conformance with the law. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(4) (c) (i) 
(1995). Therefore, the trial court properly declared a mistrial. 
The trial court also properly granted the mistrial when it 
concluded that defendant's prejudicial comments made it 
impossible for either the State or defendant to receive a fair 
trial. First, the trial court was in the best position to 
evaluate the effect on the jury of what it described as the 
%%courtroom spectacle" that defendant created. The trial court 
found that defendant's courtroom spectacle necessitated a 
mistrial because it created the possibility of confusing the jury 
about the law, and that the jury would decide the case on an 
improper basis (R. 182) . *That finding is entitled to deference 
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by this court." State V. Pearson, 818 P.2d at 585. 
Similarly, defendant's refusal to comply with the judge's 
instructions put the prosecutor in the untenable position of 
having to object constantly. Even though the defendant's conduct 
necessitated the objections, the lay jury could easily have 
believed that the State, not defendant, was obstructing the 
trial, or that the State was trying to hide information from the 
jury. The trial court acknowledged this possibility during the 
first trial (R. 516). The trial court properly concluded under 
these circumstances that neither defendant nor the State could 
receive a fair trial. 
Defendant contends that State v. Whitman, 74 P.2d 696 (Utah 
1937) controls this case. Appellant's Brief at 16-17. In that 
case, Whitman's counsel quarreled with the trial court, after 
which the trial court found counsel's conduct reprehensible, if 
not contemptuous, and declared mistrial, id. at 697. The Utah 
Supreme Court found the mistrial unjustified because the trial 
court based it only on its displeasure with counsel's conduct, 
some doubt as to a prior ruling, and the propriety of some 
comments that had passed between counsel and the court. 
Defendant contends that he engaged in conduct no worse than 
Whitman's counsel; therefore, the trial court in this case also 
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should not have declared a mistrial- The record does not support 
defendant's contention. Although not entirely clear from the 
opinion, it appears that the trial court in Whitman declared a 
mistrial after a single incident between counsel and the court. 
By contrast, defendant flagrantly disregarded the trial court's 
instructions throughout the trial, including during voir dire, 
defendant's opening statement, and his cross-examination of 
Sergeant Hall. More importantly, defendant, unlike the counsel 
in Whitman, made it impossible for the trial to proceed because 
he refused to ask anything but legally impermissible questions. 
Unlike the trial court in Whitman, the trial court in this case 
did not declare a mistrial merely because it became incensed with 
defense counsel's conduct; it properly declared a mistrial when 
defendant's conduct made it impossible for the trial to proceed. 
Defendant also complains that the trial court failed to 
consider less drastic alternatives to declaring a mistrial, but 
generally fails to identify what he thinks the trial court should 
have done. The trial court had convicted defendant of contempt, 
sentenced him to thirty days in jail, and had him taken into 
custody (R. 522). Defendant has not challenged the legitimacy of 
the contempt conviction. The only alternative left would have 
been to continue the trial in defendant's absence. Defendant 
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cites no authority to establish that this presented a better 
alternative to declaring a mistrial and allowing retrial in front 
of a jury that defendant's conduct had not already tainted. 
Defendant does suggest that if the trial court had warned 
him that it might declare a mistrial he could have avoided that 
"drastic sanction" by complying with the trial court's 
instructions. The record rebuts this argument. Defendant 
repeatedly ignored and even argued with the trial court's 
instructions. Moreover, defendant told the jury in his opening 
statement that the trial court would likely hold him in contempt 
(R.4 84). Therefore, defendant made it plain that he would not 
comply with the trial court's instructions regardless of the 
sanction imposed. Similarly, this statement and his statement 
that he did not want to go to jail when he first refused to end 
his opening statement (R. 484, 486) establish that he knew the 
sanctions for complying with the trial court's orders. He cannot 
now suggest that, if warned, he might have complied; his own 
statements establish that defendant knew the consequences of the 
action he took and that he took that action anyway. Further 
warnings would have made no difference. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the trial court complied with the statutory 
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mandate to declare on the record that a mistrial was necessary, 
and the circumstances of this case justified the trial court 
terminating the first trial. Therefore, double jeopardy did not 
bar the subsequent prosecution, and this Court should affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s Z ^ d a y 
of /VT , [tfq . 
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76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent pros-
ecution for offense out of same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out 
of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a 
different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have 
been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant 
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily 
required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be 
established to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty 
by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence 
to warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an 
acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser 
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt 
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not 
been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a 
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination takes 
place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes 
place after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the 
jury trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of 
prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is 
necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity 
with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the 
state that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict revers-
ible as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable 
to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without 
injustice to the defendant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
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•there's no clothing. There might be a few more minutes-
THE COURT: All right. Well take 15 minutes. 
MR. CASTLE: Thank you. 
THE COURT: We'll be in recess for 15 minutes. 
RECESS 
BACK ON RECORD 
THE COURT: The record will show that the members of the 
jury are present, or the members of the panel are present. Mr. Castle is present. 
Counsel for the state is present. I think the pending question, when we left to 
take a recess, Mr. Castle, was whether you had any challenges for cause to the 
panel. 
MR. CASTLE: Well, as you know, this is a "witch trial" -
THE COURT: Mr. Castle, just say yes or no, please. 
MR. CASTLE: And, it would be an insult— 
THE COURT: Mr. Castle, please say yes or no. 
-MR. CASTLE. It would be an insult to any of these people-
THE COURT: Mr. Castle, say yes or no. Do you have any 
challenges to the panel? 
MR. CASTLE: Absolutely, not. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
All right. Now, what I'm going to do is have the bailiff to come forward and 
get the list of the members of the panel from the clerk. He'll then send that to the 
prosecutor. Mr. Prosecutor, you exercise your challenge and, then pass to Mr. 
Castle, and he can exercise his challenge. Mr. Castle, each of you will be able to 
strike four-the names of four members of the panel from the jury. 
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over with. I always look at the jurors, once they're chosen for jury duty, and some] 
of your faces kind of fell, and you want to-you really don't want to do it. I know 
that. I hope that it will be informative. I hope that you will understand that without] 
jurors, with-people have a right to have a jury trial, and without your willing 
participation, and I say, willing, maybe tongue in cheek, a little bit. The Judge has| 
already explained to you, if you didnl show up, they can come out and find out 
why you didn't. Without your participation in the judicial system, it would not be 
able to function. And, I realize that you folks probably all had other things that 
you'd rather be doing. I know that—I hope it will be an informative and a good 
experience for you. If you will listen and pay attention, and you'll render a verdict 
in this case, then your service will be beneficial to the system, and everyone here 
including myself, will be grateful to you. i appreciate your attention, and thank 
you very much. 
THE COURT: Mr. Castle, the purpose of the opening, 
statement is to summarize for the jury what to expect the other-outline for the 
jury what you expect the evidence will show in the case. Do you wish to make 
your opening statement now, or do you reserve that until the close of the 
prosecution's case? 
MR. CASTLE: I'll do it now. 
THE COURT: All right. Come forward to the platform here, 
then. 
MR. CASTLE: Well, folks, Craig has a script that he follows, 
and so does Judge Anderson have a script that he follows. I donl have a script 
that I follow, and I'm not trying to make you feel sorry for me, like they said, donl 
feet sorry for me because I donl have a lawyer. Actually, I'm kinda lucky not to 
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Halls provided here a little while ago. What this is about is a difference of 
opinion. 
The question, can you be compelled to believe a lie, and can you be 
prosecuted for refusing to believe that lie in this land of liberty? This is a great 
land of liberty. I served this country as a soldier, a few years back in Viet Nam. 
Regardless of what your feelings of that conflict may be, I went without 
complaining. I was an officer, came home, happy to be alive, having served well. 
So, I do love this country. I love the constitution that our forefathers provided, 
and I feel that you need to know a little bit about me. We have a system that the 
Judge has explained to you, leaving out a few things. 
THE COURT: Mr. Castle. The opening statement-
MR. CASTLE: I did not interrupt Mr. Halls. 
THE COURT: That's right, you didn't. Mr. Castle, the 
purpose of the opening statement is for you to explain, or outline for the jury, 
what the evidence will show in this case. Now, I've given you some leeway, but, 
really, your background and your belief about the constitution are not releavant 
here, and I hope you will move now to what the evidence will show in this case. 
That's the purpose of the opening statement. 
MR. CASTLE: Ya [sic] see, you will be prevented from 
hearing my side. That's what the attempt from the bench will be. There's the law 
and the facts. There's no great issue with the facts of this case. There's a few 
exceptions that he miss spoke, but nothing very material. However, there are 
grave and vast differences on the law. In China, the tew is you will only have one 
child. Sadly, they are killing the children in excess of one. Now, if they made a 
law, here, to that effect, and you disregarded that, and you went to a jury and 
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THE COURT: Mr. Castle, now, you're still not getting dose to 
what you expect the facts will show. If you dont do that, now, then I will 
terminate your opening statement, and we will proceed with the trial. 
MR. CASTLE: This is the way it goes. Under that threat, I 
will try and talk about those other things that he wants to hear. Uh-let's go to 
Count One, if I can find it. And, I voice my objection to not being able to speak. 
And, I will say that, if I am allowed to speak, I will show you that each and every 
thing that I did, with my wife with me, lovely woman. We have eight children. I 
have absolute right to do under those circumstances. I'll show that to you, if I'm 
allowed to speak. Think he'll let me? 
THE COURT: It's time for your opening statement, Mr. 
Castle. 
MR. CASTLE: Let's see if I can find it. Failure to Stop at the 
Command of a Police Officer. He told you I stopped when the police officer 
came. He explained we had a difference of opinion concerning the law. I told 
him I wanted to go to the Judge, myself. That's-I have the right to demand to go 
to a magistrate. That's where he eventually took me. I wanted to go there 
myself. So, we have a difference ofopinion, folks, concerning the law. And, this 
charge bears five years in prison. 
THE COURT: Mr. Castle, I'm telling you know, you are not to 
make appeals to sympathy-
MR. CASTLE: Oh, let's not be sympathetic to me, folks. 
THE COURT: (continuing)-or to discuss what possible 
sentence may be imposed if you're convicted. That's not something that the jury 
should consider at all. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Castle, now, in this courtroom you will refer 
to Mr. Halls as, "Mr. Halls." You will refer to me as "Judge," or "Your Honor, and 
you may refer to members of the jury as "Ladies and Gentlemen," or "Members of] 
the Jury." You will show respect of everyone in the courtroom during the entire 
course of the trial. 
MR. CASTLE: You can call me, "David." 
So, I did stop at the command of a police officer, after the difference of 
opinion. There were not heated words, or anything, and there's some 
inaccuracies there, which I'll explain to you during the trial. But, I will show you 
that I had the right to demand to go before a magistrate. Speeding, folks. The 
speed limit here used to be, approximately, what I was going. The purpose of the 
speed limit is to maintain safety. After the Iran oil embargo in 1974, they reduced 
the speed limit because it was using too much fuel, not because of safety. Now 
that that has been lifted, and the statute of limitations of the statute has actually 
run out, and Congress is considering going back up to 70 and 75, and, I don't 
disagree with 68. I doni say I was going 68,1 doni know if I was going 68. I was 
just driving down the road with my wife at a very safe rate of speed, going along 
with most of the other cars. I had passed a truck that had been going slowly up 
the hilt and flying down the hill. I just passed a truck, and I will show you that I 
was operating my car in a reasonable and safe, very judicious manner. As to the 
next one. Let's see what that is. There's so many here for this incident, that has 
changed so much of my life over the last year. It's called "Interference With a 
Police Officer Making a Lawful Arrest." There's a little difference of memory 
involved there. I will state what it is. he said I grabbed his hand, and that is not 
the case. He's the one who tried to intrude into my car. He's the one that 
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gentlemen, and I do consider you ladies and gentlemen. I have a great deal of 
respect for you. I hold this court in nothing but contempt. I have nothing but 
contempt for this court, and maybe I'll be found in contempt of court and go to jail, 
but I cannot have anything but contempt for what they have done with me, and I 
hope that I'm allowed to tell you all about it. Perhaps, that time will come during 
this day or two. Uh, it also states that, you mustn't interfere with an officer 
making a lawful arrest. And, we have a difference of opinion there. Uh, I believe 
that I will be able to show that it was not a lawful arrest that he was trying to 
make. So, we'll go to the next one. Count Number Four, Escape. Uh-that, 
that's a tough one. I dont know how I escaped. I wasnt in custody. And, when 
you read this law, it's talking about escaping from prison, and various things, and, 
there was no attempt to escape. There was no escaping, and I believe I can 
show you that, and that is what I intend to do. Count Number Five, Driving on 
Suspension or Revocation of Another State. We have a difference of opinion 
there, too. I have explained to the officers and attempted to explain to the court 
my standing in law. I am one who has seen numerous abuses by government. 
Maybe, in the small town of Monticello, you haven't seen any abuses by 
government, and several-well, a couple of years back, I decided to make a 
stand. That stand involved, the driver's license, for one thing. Maybe you've 
heard about us hard-headed people who refuse to have a driver's license. Well, I 
refused to have a driver's license. HI never get another one. I was tested for 
competency when I was 16. I started driving when I was about 11 or 12. I drove 
on the farm. By the time I was 16, in my state, I was old enough to get a driver's 
license. I thought boy, that's great. Ill get a driver's license, then, I can drive 
everywhere. I went and took a test for competency. I passed okay. I knew how 
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that test for competency. And, ever since then, I've been paying taxes on my 
right, my absolute right, to travel. And, I decided some time back to exercise my 
absolute right to travel. So, that's the difference of opinion that I have with, 
Judge Anderson. I believe that I have the right to travel, and I'm going to 
exercise it. I'm an American. I believe in the pursuit of life, liberty, happiness. 
That's in the preamble to the constitution. Something that I love and have 
studied, and I hope you have. I hope you appreciate the constitution like I do. 
So, we have great differences of opinion, here. This is a court about, a trial about] 
differences of opinion. IVe never hurt anyone. IVe never taken something from 
anyone. I take it back. I took a nickel out of Mom's purse when I was a kid. I 
took a keychain from the store when I was a kid. But, now, people, if everyone 
were like me, we wouldn't have any locks on doors, and we wouldn't have any 
prisons. 
And, I do feel you have a right to know about me, who I am, where I come 
from, because I have the right to be judged to the jury-by a jury of my peers. 
Know what that meant in the beginning? Neighbors, people that knew you, 
people that knew of your character, your beliefs, people who knew what you've 
done in life. None of you know that. I could stand here and tell you all the lies in 
the worid, and you might believe them and you might not. But, none of you know 
me. I would really like to change that before that trial is over, somehow. I would 
like to be able to stand here and have you ask me questions. That's the way 
juries used to be-that's the way they used to be held, in the beginning of this 
country. The jurors asked the questions of the defendant their neighbor. That's 
what happened, people, ladies and gentlemen, and I do consider you ladies and 
gentlemen. 
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weapon. I have a jeweler, a coin dealer. I have been at the other end of a gun 
before, in my store in Aibuquerque. I have been laid face down on the floor by an 
assailant, who put a gun to my head as I lay on the floor. Others, my 
competitors, all of them are competitors, and friends. Others have had far worse 
experiences than that. One of my best friends was shot and killed— 
THE COURT: I'm going to cut you off on this subject for the 
second time, Mr. Castle. 
MR. CASTLE: Well, all right. What do you want me to go to 
now? 
THE COURT: Whatever you have that pertains to what the 
evidence will show with regard to the charges. 
MR. CASTLE: Well, what about the odds-what about the jury] 
of my peers? Do I ever get a jury of my peers? 
THE COURT: You can sit down, then, Mr. Castle. 
MR. CASTLE: No. I'm not going to sit down. This is my trial. 
THE COURT: Your opening statement will be-
MR. CASTLE: No, it isn't. 
THE COURT: I'm going to say it one more time, Mr. Castle. 
Your opening statement is over. 
MR. CASTLE: I don't want to be put in jail, but, they will do 
that here. 
THE COURT: Call your first witness, Mr. Halls. 
MR. HALLS: I call Doug Hall, Trooper Hall. 
DOUGLAS B, HALL 
A WITNESS CALLED at the instance of the plaintiff, having first been duly 
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unlawful, and had stated that he wanted to go see the Judge. I certainly didn't 
want him to see the Judge, after having refused to give up a weapon. When we 
stopped him the second time, ft required we momentarily, for some minutes, 
shut down the south-bound lanes of traffic, because this happened in the middle 
of the roadway. His car was stopped in the middle of his lane, and I stopped right] 
behind him in the traffic lane. And, then, Mr. Pierce was put in significant danger 
by standing in front of Mr. Castle's running automobile and with the idea that Mr. 
Castle had a weapon in his possession. 
Q Ordinarily, would you approach the vehicle with your gun drawn? 
A No. Not under-Under these types of circumstances, yes. 
Otherwise, no. 
Q Is there a danger when you draw your weapon? I mean-
A Certainly. 
Q In his efforts to protect himself and his wife, did he place himself in 
significant additional danger because you had to effect your weapon? 
A Basically, he just - It scared me half to death, at the time. There 
had been known cases of accidental discharges of police officer's weapons, and 
the idea that I had to draw my weapon and, and, put him in that jeopardy, and the 
jeopardy that I was in knowing that he had a weapon that he refused to surrender 
it, and was unwilling to obey any commands, I dkJnl know what he was going to 
do next. I certainly-l was in jeopardy. On top of that, I didnt appreciate the fact 
that I had to put him, or anyone else, in jeopardy because of his actions. 
Q I have no further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Castle, you may question this witness. 
CROSS EXAMINATIOM 
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Uh, who do you work for? 
The Utah Highway Patrol. 
Is that the same as working for the state of Utah? 
Yes. 
How long have you been doing that? 
Seventeen years. 
Do you have a second job? 
No. 
Does your wife work? 
No. 






Okay. Well, you have four more to QO. Are you dependant upon the 






For your food, dothing, and shelter? 
Certainly. 
Your wife and children are dependant upon you for their support, 





Do you have a home? 
Yes. I 
61 
Q Paid for? 
A No. 
Q Mortgage payments? 
A Yes. 
Q Well, you're a good American. Uh, cars? 
A Yes. 
Q How many? 
A Two. 
Q Pickups? 
A One car, one pickup. 
Q Boats? 
A A camp trailer. 
Q Okay. So and a late model police cruiser, right? 
A That I don't pay for. 
Q Okay. Well so, you work for the state of Utah? 
A Yes. 
Q And, who is it that's whose action is against me? 
A The state of Utah. 
Q You're a player against me? 
A Basically, I guess you could say that. 
Q Okay. Do you - let's see, are they trying to take any money from 
A There have been fines -
Q The state of Utah? 
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Okay. How much? 
Uh-
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, I'm going to object to the relevancy of that 
THE COURT: Objection sustained. 
(by Mr. Castle, continuing) Is it a lot? 
THE COURT: I sustained the objection, Mr. Castle. 
MR. CASTLE: Why is that? 
THE COURT: I don't have to tell you, actually. 
MR. CASTLE: How *bout that. Maybe they want to know. 
(by Mr. Castle, continuing) So, you are a witness paid for by the state 
Yes. 
Okay. Aren't they the ones that are suing me? 
THE COURT: That's the third time you asked that, Mr. Castle. Yes, 
he's employed by the state of Utah, and, I think everyone understands that, so-
Q (by Mr. Castle) Okay. Isn't there a conflict of interest, here in you 
testifying against me for your employer? 
A I would say, in my opinion, it would be mighty removed. 
Q Would it really? 
A Uh hum (affirmative). 
Q What would happen if you stopped giving tickets? 
A Well, I don't give many tickets, anyway, because that's not my 
primary responsibility as a supervisor. 
Q What would happen if the patrolmen stopped giving tickets? 
A We would have a discussion with them about what their job was. 
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been any contest to see who gives the most tickets? 
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, I'm going to object to this. If he's trying to 
show that -
THE COURT: Sustained. You dont have to give a speech, Mr. 
Halls. Your objection is sustained. 
Q (by Mr. Castle) And, I'm just learning. I don't know what you do 
here. What happens to the money that is collected from people like me? 
MR. HALLS: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (by Mr. Castle, continuing) Isnt your salary paid through those 
tickets? 
MR. HALLS: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. CASTLE: I object, also, just for the record, to your objection. 
Q (by Mr. Castle, continuing) Didn't you tell me privately that you 
agreed with many of my beliefs concerning the constitution and my freedom? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Yes, you did. Okay. Thank you. Can you tell me what you do agree 
with? 
A There was a lot we discussed that day. As I recall, you talked about 
how you thought-Well, you talked about the idea of things being lawful, but not 
legal. I didn't understand what you were saying on that regard. You thought that 
the country was heading in different directions. You thought, I don't remember 
most of it. But, I do remember that we agreed on or two points. I don't 
remember, specifically, what they were. 
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you don't, I'll -
A I couldn't quote it for you. 
Q Okay. Well, there's some pretty basic things there. The right to life, 
A Okay. 
Q [Continuing] - liberty, and the pursuit of-
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, I'm not sure how the preamble to the 
constitution or the right to life have anything to do with the charges speeding or 
evading an officer. It's irrelevant. 
THE COURT: Well, as a matter of fact, those things are in the 
Declaration of Independence, Mr. Castle. 
MR. CASTLE: No. That's the preamble to the constitution. Go 
check, I'll wait. I don't want to show you up. 
THE COURT: But, regardless,-
MR. CASTLE: The Declaration of Independence starts out a little 
differently. 
charges. 
THE COURT: Objection sustained. This isn't relevant to the 
MR. CASTLE: It's got a lot of relevance to this case. 
THE COURT: Mr. Castle. It's not relevant. I sustained the 
objection. Move on. 
MR. CASTLE: And, what was the objection? 
MR. HALLS: I object on the-
MR. CASTLE: Object to what? 
THE COURT: Asking-the beliefs of this officer about-
MR. HALLS: The preamble to the constitution. 
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THE COURT: All right. Mr. Castle, I have ruled that the beliefs have 
of this officer as to what he agrees with you about, and what he doesn't agree 
with you about, are not relevant. 
MR. CASTLE: Hum. Very well. 
Q (By Mr. Castle, continuing) So, you are a peace officer? 
A Yes 
Q And maybe as a peace officer, have you caught any bank robbers? 




MR. HALLS: Your Honor, I dont want to appear-you know, I don't 
mind going through this all afternoon, but it's irrelevant. Basically-
THE COURT: Your objection is sustained. Mr. Castle-
MR. CASTLE: You'd like me sit down and shut up? 
MR. HALLS: Well, my probtem-
THE COURT: Hang on Mr. - You dont need to say anything, Mr. 
Halls. I understand that you're concerned about appeanng to be wanting to hide 
something. It's my responsibility to make the decisions about what's relevant in 
this case. What's relevant in this case is what the defendant did on September 
26,1994. If you'll get to that Mr. Castle, I wont sustain any more objections. 
MR. CASTLE: What I'm fighting is, well, — 
Q (by Mr. Castle, continuing) Are you beholden to your employer, in 
any way, Hi testifying in court? 
THE COURT: That's been asked and answered. Go ahead with 
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MR. CASTLE: What was the answer? 
THE COURT: He said he didn't feel beholden. 
MR. CASTLE: Well, let's find out. 
Q (by Mr. Castle) We talked about liberty, just a few minutes ago. 
What is liberty? 
A Liberty, as I understand it, is the freedom within an organized society 
to do things, at will so long as it doesn't interfere or jeopardize the rights of 
others. 
Q In other words, harm someone? 
A I suppose that's one way of saying it. 
Q Is liberty a right? 
A Certainly. 
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, I'm going to have to object again. I would 
like to make one comment when I do this. I know I'm risking-l am risking, 
personally, antagonizing the jury because I'm objecting to everything that Mr. 
Castle is saying. But, asking this witness about his philosophy of liberty and the 
constitution doesnl have anything to do with the statutes of the state of Utah. If 
he wants to-l'd like the court maybe to instruct the jury that a constitutional 
argument is not appropriate while questioning this witness. If he has a 
constitutional argument to make with regard to the charges brought against him, 
that is something that's done to the court, where he has an opportunity to brief it, 
I have an opportunity to brief it, the Supreme Court decides it. It isn't something 
that is decided by something that he thinks, and, that's where we're at. 
THE COURT: Right Yes, the objection is sustained, because the 
question is argumentative and irrelevant. 
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instruct you to disregard these questions about the officer's philosophy. Those 
questions are not relevant, are not for you to determine. The thing for you to 
determine, is whether the defendant committed the offenses that are charged. 
And, I'm hoping Mr. Castle will get to that. 
MR. CASTLE: I will. Certainly. 
Q (by Mr. Castle) This is about traveling in an automobile. 
A Yes, uh hum (affirmative). 
Q This is about the liberty to travel in an automobile, is it not? 
A Well, as it relates to an automobile, it relates to your speed, and 
whether or not you are required to have a driver's license. 
Q Exactly. So, I think the liberty argument is very relevant as to 
whether I needed a driver's license, or not. So, I would like to pursue that. 
THE COURT: I've sustained the objection to that, Mr. Castle. Move 
on to another line of questioning. 
MR. CASTLE: I object to jury tampering. I consider it jury tampering, 
to fail to allow all the arguments to come before the jury. 
THE COURT: Your objection is noted and overruled, Mr. Castle. Do 
you have any questions about what happened on September 26,1994? 
MR. CASTLE: I have a lot of them. 
THE COURT: Get to them. 
Q (By Mr. Castle, continuing) When you clocked me, as you have 
testified that you did, pursued me, did I stop? 
A Yes, you did. 
Q Did we have a discussion? 
A Yes. 
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A You stated you didn't have a driver's license, that you didn't need 
one. I asked you for identification, and you told me your name. 
Q Did I give you an insurance paper with my name on it? 
A You may have. I don't recall. 
Q Did you ask for proof of insurance? 
A Yes, I did, registration and insurance. 
Q Okay. Did you get them? 
A I donl recall if I did or not, at that time. 
Q If you had not, would you have charged me with anything in addition 
than what you charged me with? 
A I may have. 
I think so. Thank you. But, I did give you other identification. 
We could make the presumption, yes. 
Thank you. Any other difference of opinion? 
I donl know. Ask me and I don't know what you're getting at. 
When you testified I told you I had a gun-
Yes, uh hum (affirmative). 










Q [Continuing] - we talked about? 
A That's what you expressed. That's right. 
Q What was your opinion? 
A My opinion was-
MR. HALLS: Objection, Your Honor. The officer brought a charge 
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basically borne out of the charges. 
THE COURT: The opinion about both of them is irrelevant. The 
objection is sustained. I doesn't matter what Mr. Castle thinks, or what Trooper 
Hall thinks. 
MR. CASTLE: We all know that. 
I'd like to approach-
THE COURT: Mr. Castle, do not make any further side comments to 
the members of - to the jury. I'm directly instructing you not to do that. 
MR. CASTLE: Can I come up to this man? 
THE COURT: You may approach him to present him with something 
that he needs to look at. 
MR. CASTLE: I'd like him to read something. 
Q (By Mr. Castle, continuing) Your opinion was that I didn't have the 
right to have the gun. 
A To have the gun concealed on your person or in the automobile. 
Q Concealed in the automobile. Okay. Let's have you read something 
here from the criminal code of Utah. Would you read this, 76-10-504? 
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, we can take official notice of the criminal 
statute, if that's relevant. I'm not sure this officer reading this statute in court is 
going to do anything. I think Its— 
THE COURT: That's right. I'm going to instruct the jury about what 
the taw is and the defendant has an opportunity to request instructions with 
reference to the statute. 
MR. CASTLE: I object. Because there is a law here that says I can 
have a gun-




























M. Jane Mussulman 
Certified Court Transcriber 
P.O. Box S31 
MonbotHo, Utah 64535 
Telephone: (801) 587-2351 
ask this question of a witness. That's a matter for jury instructions. 
MR. CASTLE: I've seen them, and they do not have this statute in 
them. Thisstatute-
THE COURT: You have the right to propose a proper jury 
instruction, Mr. Castle. 
MR. CASTLE: This point is very pertinent to our difference of 
opinion. 
THE COURT: Mr. Castle, do not argue with me. I have sustained 
the objection. 
MR. CASTLE: I'd like to show you what I'd—I'd like to show you what 
I'd like him to read, please. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CASTLE: This, except this, then right before-
THE COURT: The record will note that the defendant is proper 
reading of Section 76-10-504, Subsection One. 
MR. CASTLE: Well, wait, wait, wait, wait. 
THE COURT: Sub-section One, what else? 
MR. CASTLE: Section 76-10-510. 
THE COURT: All right. And Section 76-10-510. 
MR. CASTLE: What's the-
THE COURT: You've made your record, Mr. Castle. 
MR. CASTLE: This is, literally, entitled, Possession of Weapon 
Authorized-
THE COURT: Mr. Castle. No further discussion of those sections. 
If they're relevant to the charge, I will instruct the jury with regard to them, but 


























MR. CASTLE: Is a law relevant that says I can have a gun, in my 
car, concealed? 
THE COURT: Mr. Castle-
MR. CASTLE: Am I being charged with that -
THE COURT: [Continuing] - no further discussion of these statutes. 
MR. CASTLE: I'm being charged with this very thing, and it says 
right here, I -
THE COURT: Mr. Castle. I find you in Contempt of Court. Do you 
have anything to say before I sentence you. 
MR. CASTLE: I demand a court trial on a Contempt of Court charge 
THE COURT: You are not entitled to a jury trial on that charge. I 
sentence you to 30 days in jail. 
Members of the Jury, because this has happened, I'm forced to declare a 
Mistrial in this case. I'm reluctant to do that, because it means your effort here is 
wasted, but Mr. Castle's is not following instructions-
MR. CASTLE: Your Honor, you're the one who is in contempt of 
court. 
THE COURT: You're excused, Members of the Jury. Bailiff, take thej 
defendant into custody. I'll set his arraignment for Thursday, the 20th, at 10:00 
a.m. 
MR. CASTLE: I move for a Stay of Execution. 
THE COURT: Denied. Jury, you're excused. 
(Whereupon these proceedings are concluded.) 
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